

interactions. The face presented in a given situation depends not only on the current audience but also on the current conditions. The combination of audience and situation determines how much and what information will be disclosed. Furthermore, people can have many roles between which they fluidly move and can act in multiple capacities, often simultaneously [14]. How an individual balances privacy depends on his personal situation including family life, education, social class, and psychological composition; furthermore, his needs are highly contextual and continually shift depending on situational events [15].

The impact of privacy violations depends in part on the content of what has been revealed [11]. Activities convey the essence of a persona; knowledge of an individual's prior activities is more sensitive when their identity is known as the activities can reveal hidden personae [10]. Traces of activity that are in character with the persona a user is trying to maintain [2] and are appropriate for the setting where the traces are viewed should cause little concern (e.g., non-confidential, work-related, browsing activity in the workplace). However, activities that reveal information that is not part of the persona presented (e.g., political affiliation) or that are perceived as transgressions (e.g., personal browsing if company policy does not allow it) may cause great discomfort [12].

Hutchings and Pierce [7] found that privacy issues were a factor when their participants considered how they might divide an application's interface across devices in private, semi-private, and public multi-display environments; particularly for the semi-public work environment; participants wanted to shield personal activities from their colleagues.

CONTEXTUAL MODEL OF INCIDENTAL INFORMATION PRIVACY IN WEB BROWSERS

We conducted exploratory research consisting of a survey and two field studies in order to learn more about the factors that impact privacy in this specific domain. Through the survey, we investigated how various dispositional and situational variables (potential viewers/users of the device, location, level of control retained over input devices, sensitivity of the visible content) impacted participants' inherent privacy concerns and their reported browsing activities (preliminary results presented in [6]). We also examined their actual activities and privacy levels applied through two field studies [4,5]. Triangulating the results from these studies allowed us to develop a model of incidental information privacy concerns during web browsing (Figure 1, see [3] for a full discussion of the development of this model).

This model of incidental information privacy concerns incorporates both situational and dispositional factors. Privacy comfort in a given situation depends not only on a person's disposition to privacy (i.e., their inherent privacy concerns), but also on the context of the situation. While




Figure 1. Contextual model of incidental information privacy concerns during web browsing.

inherent privacy concern indicates someone's overall privacy preferences, the situational context will determine what decision is made as to which information is appropriate to reveal [8,15]. The situational context included the device and location where browsing occurred, as well as potential users of the device and viewers of the display, and the level of control retained over the input devices. Furthermore the perceived sensitivity of content depends on which content is potentially visible. Which traces of browsing activities may appear in web browser convenience features depends on the browsing activities conducted, the browser settings, and any preventative actions taken prior to collaboration to safeguard privacy.

Similar to the Westin-Harris [13] privacy segmentation model, we were also able to segment survey participants by their inherent privacy concerns [6]. These segments were determined by participants' level of overall privacy concerns and the magnitude of contextual differences in those privacy concerns across the different viewing contexts (i.e., viewer, level of control, content sensitivity). *Privacy fundamentalists* are those participants with few differences according to context and low overall privacy comfort levels. *Privacy unconcerned* participants are those

with few differences according to context and high overall privacy comfort levels. *Privacy pragmatists* are those participants with high contextual differences. Privacy pragmatists were further subdivided according to their overall privacy comfort level (*wary, circumspect*) or according to which factors impact their privacy concerns (i.e., *viewer, level of control, content sensitivity*). These classifications could be used to determine suitable default settings for a privacy enhanced PIM system based upon a person's responses to a questionnaire during system initialization.

VISUAL PRIVACY CONCERNS FOR PIM SYSTEMS

The factors (Figure 1) are specific to traces of web browsing activity; however, while the nature of the visible content will change, the impact of sensitivity of the potentially visible content, level of control, viewer, and inherent privacy concerns will likely apply to other personal information management systems. For example, a desktop search PIM system will generate different types of potentially visible information and have different settings and filtering mechanisms for results. However, the sensitivity of the information which may be visible, the level of control retained over what is displayed (e.g. avoiding specific searches), the relationship to the viewer of the incidental information, and the inherent privacy concerns of the user will likely impact the privacy concerns for a given situation.

CONCLUSION

Visual privacy issues can occur when people collaborate around someone's personal computer. Our model of incidental information privacy, which includes both dispositional and situational variables, is unique in its incorporation of multiple factors specific to visual privacy concerns as well as its coverage of both privacy concerns and the activities that generate the information to be protected. Our model can be used as a guide for future study of visual privacy concerns both of incidental information within web browsers and also for other personal information management systems which may give rise to similar incidental information privacy concerns. Researchers investigating other domains, particularly those with mobile users, changing contexts, or changing user roles may find this model useful when considering potential privacy concerns.

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